Wage Bargaining in a Multiple Application Search Model with Recall

Lari Viianto ()

No EC201001, Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers from Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: In this paper I extend the multiple application urn-ball game structure, introduced by Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) and Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006), to an scenario where firms can, after a rejection, make additional wage offers. This expands the game structure from a one-shot set up to a sequential game. A firm, after being rejected by an applicant, can choose another applicant to make him a new wage o¤er. This possibility gives firms an outside option after a rejection. This increases the bargaining power of firms, implying a change in their wage offer behavior. The resulting wage distribution is hump-shaped with the density of wage offers concentrated on central values, rather than in extreme values.

Keywords: Matching; Labor Market; Multiple application; Wage distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J31 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2010-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://economia.ugto.org/WorkingPapers/EC201001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gua:wpaper:ec201001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers from Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Luis Sanchez Mier ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).