Outside Options in Nash Bargaining
Patrick Martin and
Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance
In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.
Keywords: BARGAINING; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:1996-3
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