Truth or Consequences? Enforcing Pollution Standards

C.J. McKenna and John Livernois

Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: Evidence suggests that a surprisingly large fraction of firms comply with pollution emission standards even though expected penalities for noncompliance are low. We offer an explanation of this puzzle by extending the standard model of enforcement to include a self-seporting requirement and enforcement power.

Keywords: POLLUTION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; REGULATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:1996-7

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