Liability Law and the Control of Externalities with Costly and Uncertain Litigation

Ross McKitrick

Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: Is liability law a suitable instrument for controlling externalities? The optimistic view from the law and economics literature conflicts with observed outcomes from jurisdictions relying on a tort-based procedure for controlling externalities. This discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that results from the highly simplified models used by earlier writers are not robust to modest improvements in the realism of the model structures.

Keywords: EXTERNALITIES; LAW; LIABILITY; COSTS; UNCERTAINTY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 K13 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:1998-2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stephen Kosempel ().