Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Shareholders Own More than One Share

Charles Cadsby and E. Maynes

Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We study the tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process in the laboratory. An equilibrium outcome in which value-increasing takeovers always just succeed fails to emerge. Rather, tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level with successful takeovers occuring more often toward the end of each game. Although game-theoretic results predict that neither bid level nor bid type should affect the number of shraes tendered nor the extent to which bids succeed, bith factors are found to be significant, albeit less so as each game draws to a close.

Keywords: TAKEOVERS; GAME THEORY; SHARES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 G3 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory When Shareholders Own More Than One Share (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:1998-3

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stephen Kosempel ().