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Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence

J. Atsu Amegashie, Charles Cadsby and Yang Song ()

No 507, Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We examine equilibrium selection in a two-stage sequential elimination contest in which contestants compete for a single prize. This game has a continuum of equilibria, only one of which satisfies the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) refinement. That equilibrium involves “burning out” by using all of one’s resources in the first stage. It is Pareto-dominated by many other equilibria. We find that CPNE predicts well when four people compete, but not when eight people compete for two second-stage spots. Using a cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, we show that when the number of players and the mean number of thinking steps are large, the CH prediction involves burning out. This provides a partial explanation of our results. We also develop a formal argument as to why CPNE logic is more compelling with more players. We conclude that more competition leads to higher bids, and that burning out is indeed a competitive phenonemon.

Keywords: all-pay auction; burning out; cognitive hierarchy; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; contests; experiment; step thinking. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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