Motivação Partidária nas Transferências Voluntárias da União: O papel do Legislativo Federal
Fernanda L. Marciniuk,
Maurício Soares Bugarin and
Débora Costa Ferreira
No 101/2020, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília
Abstract:
This paper presents empirical evidence that the distribution of federal voluntary transfers is biased in favor of municipalities in which the mayor's party has higher identification with the coalition of parties in the Legislature that has strong representation in the municipality. This research measures party identification between the federal Legislature and the municipal Executive branch based on Bendavid -Val's locational quotients applied to voting data . The paper's main contribution is to go beyond the mayor-president partisan transfers' approach, and to shed light on the important role the federal Legislature plays in the partisan distribution of subnational voluntary transfers.
Keywords: Transferências Voluntárias; Convênios Públicos; Quociente Locacional de Bendavid-Val; Identificação partidária; Transferências partidárias do Legislativo; Voluntary intergovernmental transfers; Intergovernmental grants; Bendavid-Val's locational coefficient; Party identification; Legislative partisan transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1012020
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23574351
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