Vale a pena ser um bom gestor? Comportamento Eleitoral e Reeleição no Brasil
Pedro Cavalcante
No 33/2013, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília
Abstract:
Is it worth to be a good mayor? Do voters reward or punish incumbent based on their fiscal outputs? Part of the scholars is grounded on Michigan School's assumptions, which indicate that voters are uninformed and lack political knowledge. Hence they frequently make myopic electoral decisions. On the contrary, the literature of electoral accountability, specially the retrospective voting, argues that even though voters are not completely informed, they make competent electoral decisions. Ultimately, citizens vote rewarding or punishing the incumbents based on their administration results. In order to test citizen competence and political accountability assumptions, this paper examines if voters reward better fiscal policy performance by reelecting incumbent mayors, using indexes that reflect important aspects concerning fiscal outputs. The multivariate model results confirm the retrospective voting since it is observed significant effects of budgetary and financial management on mayor's reelection probability.
Keywords: Comportamento Eleitoral; Reeleição; Gestão Fiscal; Brasil; Electoral Behavior; Reelection; Fiscal Management; Brazil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-27
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:332013
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23602902
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