Um modelo de jogo cooperativo sobre os efeitos da corrupção no gasto público

Rogério Pereira and Tatiane Almeida de Menezes

No 40/2014, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília

Abstract: This paper analyzes the growth of the population's perception regarding to corruption crimes around the world, assuming the hypothesis of economic coordination among public managers to elaborate strokes against the state. Using samples of international public spending, containing 22 countries and dynamic panel models, it is concluded that exist correlation to a more efficient partition between countries for defense spending. In addition to this observation, it appears that there is correlation between the corrupt behavior of policymakers for spending on public services, environmental protection and community works.

Keywords: Gasto Público; Corrupção e Eficiência Econômica; Public Spend; Corruption and Economic Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:402014

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23601882

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