On the Optimality of Exclusion in Multi-dimensional Screening

Paulo Barelli, Suren Basov, Maurício Soares Bugarin and Ian King

No 8/2013, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília

Abstract: We extend Armstrong's [2] result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result holds true in a large class of models and is applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and consumer types. Second, we extend the result beyond the monopolistic market structure to some oligopoly settings. We illustrate the results with examples and applications.

Keywords: Multi-dimensional screening; exclusion; regulation of a monopoly; involuntary unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D42 D43 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:82013

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23602661

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