Eficiência, atratividade e dissuasão de acordos de leniência e combate à corrupção: o caso da Operação Lava-Jato

Rafael M. Gomes, Roberto Aragão Neto, Maurício Soares Bugarin and André L. Gama

No 83/2018, Economics and Politics Working Paper Series from Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília

Abstract: This paper uses game theory to build additional tools for those who work with leniency policy on calculating sanctions imposed to lenient firms from cartels involved in public biddings, under Brazilian legislation. The main characteristic of this analysis is modelling the State as a player who not only designs the mechanism of the leniency program but is also the most affected by the cartel, and is especially interested at imposing due sanctions. Thus, we show how to harmonize the attractiveness of leniency and its advantage to the State keeping the focus on the deterrence effect. We find that, under certain conditions, leniency policies stop being an impunity factor and become a useful tool for fighting corruption. However, the paper shows that the formula to calculate fines currently adopted by the State makes it harder to meet these conditions.

Keywords: Leniência; Cartel; Multa; Teoria dos jogos; Operação Lava-Jato; Leniency; Fine; Game theory; "Car-Wash" Operation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:832018

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23594676

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