Unexpected Bedfellows: The GATT, the WTO, and Some Democratic Rights

Susan Aaronson and M. Rodwan Abouharb ()
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M. Rodwan Abouharb: Department of Political Science, Lousisiana State University

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: The WTO system has democratic rights spillovers. In this paper, we show how GATT and WTO rules induce memberstates to advance several democratic rights: specifically political participation, due process and access toinformation. We use qualitative and quantitative tools to examine this process. Our quantitative analysis found thatcountries that have been members of the GATT/WTO for longer periods of time saw statistically significantimprovements in our metrics for political participation and due process rights. However, we did not have similarlyrobust findings for access to information. We think this may reflect the limited amount of quantitative data availablefor this period. We note that the WTO is to some degree a bill of rights for foreign market actors. Ironically, inrepressive states, its rules may empower domestic market actors who may not have been able to use existingdomestic remedies to obtain information, influence policies or challenge leadership. We urge other scholars to testour findings about how the WTO and democratic rights became unexpected bedfellows.

Keywords: trade; WTO; GATT; democracy; democratic rights; accessions; freedom of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F59 P16 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2010-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in NCCR Trade Regulations, 01 Feb 2010; Forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly June 2011

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2010-12

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