Peltzman on Ice: Evidence on Compensating Behavior Using a Natural Experiment from Ice Hockey
Alberto Chong () and
Pascual Restrepo ()
Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy
We provide evidence of the Peltzman effect by tracking the professional path of each hockey player that ended up in the National Hockey League from 2001 to 2006. We take advantage of the fact that visor use has not always been compulsory throughout a player's career, which allows us to compare the change in behavior of users and non-users of visors when they are forced to use them. We find that whereas the average penalty minutes per game is 0.8, visors cause a substantial increase of 0.2 penalty minutes per game. Players become more aggressive when forced to wear a visor, partially offsetting its protective effect and creating potential spillover effects to other players.
Keywords: Peltzman Effect; Ice Hockey; Compensating Behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 K23 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-law and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2011-12
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