US-Tyres: Upholding a WTO Accession Contract – Imposing Pain for Little Gain

Steve Charnovitz and Bernard Hoekman

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: In 2009, the United States imposed additional tariffs for a three-year period on imports of automotive tires from China under a special-safeguard provision included in China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO. China challenged the measure in the WTO. The case marked the first WTO dispute in which a challenged safeguard was upheld by the Appellate Body; the first in which an accession protocol was used successfully as a defense; and the first that China lost as a complaining party. It also was noteworthy in that the safeguard was sought by a labor union, not the domestic industry. This paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body's findings and discusses a number of the legal and policy implications regarding China's Accession Protocol, the Safeguards Agreement, and WTO accession law, as well as economic aspects of the case.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: US–Tyres: Upholding a WTO Accession Contract – Imposing Pain for Little Gain (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2013-12

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