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Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up?

Susan Aaronson and M. Rodwan Abouharb
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M. Rodwan Abouharb: University London College

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: The WTO says nothing about corruption. This paper uses qualitative and quantitative analysis to examine whether the GATT/WTO, without deliberate intent, helps nations improve governance and fight corruption. Under GATT/WTO rules, policymakers are obligated to act in an evenhanded manner, to facilitate transparent trade-related policymaking and to provide due process to such policymaking by allowing individuals to comment on and challenge trade related regulations before they are adopted. Evenhandedness, access to information, and due process are anticorruption counterweights. We hypothesized that we would see both qualitative and quantitative evidence of improvement in these government metrics among developing country WTO members, especially during the accession process. However, that is not what we found; instead our data shows members gradually improve governance.

Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ger, nep-int and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/2014WP/AaronsonIIEPWP20147.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2014-07

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