Can Trade Agreements Solve the Wicked Problem of Disinformation

Susan Aaronson

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Disinformation is a wicked problem. Increasingly, disinformation comes from overseas. Many nations have adopted a wide range of strategies to mitigate disinformation. This patchwork may not be effective in mitigating cross-border disinformation. Moreover, the lack of coherent approaches could also lead to trade distortions and spillover effects upon internet openness and generativity. This paper shows how policymakers might use trade agreements to govern the cross-border data flows that at times fuel disinformation.

Keywords: trade; disinformation; spam; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 F68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2021-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2021-12

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