Where Do Social Preferences Come From?

Chaning Jang () and John Lynham
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Chaning Jang: Department of Psychology, Princeton University

No 2015-8, Working Papers from University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Abstract: Where do preferences for fairness come from? We use a unique field setting to test for a spillover of sharing norms from the workplace to a laboratory experiment. Fishermen working in teams receive random income shocks (catching fish) that they must regularly divide among themselves. We demonstrate a clear correlation between sharing norms in the field and sharing norms in the lab. Furthermore, the spillover effect is stronger for fishermen who have been exposed to a sharing norm for longer, suggesting that our findings are not driven by selection effects. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that work environments shape social preferences.

Keywords: ultimatum game; social preferences; fairness; workplace spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C7 C9 D1 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Where do social preferences come from? (2015)
Working Paper: Where Do Social Preferences Come From? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hae:wpaper:2015-8

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