Which Way to Cooperate
Todd Kaplan () and
Bradley Ruffle ()
No WP2011/5, Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics
We introduce a two-player, binary-choice game in which both players have a privately known incentive to enter, yet the combined surplus is highest if only one enters. Repetition of this game admits two distinct ways to cooperate: turn taking and cutoffs, which rely on the player's private value to entry. A series of experiments highlights the role of private information in determining which mode players adopt. If an individual's entry values vary little (e.g., mundane tasks), taking turns is likely; if these potential values are diverse (e.g., difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or preferences), cutoff cooperation emerges.
JEL-codes: C90 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Forthcoming in The Economic Journal
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Journal Article: Which Way to Cooperate (2012)
Working Paper: Which Way to Cooperate (2011)
Working Paper: Which way to cooperate (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201105
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