EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Fairness, Efficiency, and the Nash Bargaining Solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

No WP2011/10, Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics

Abstract: A bargaining solution balances fairness and efficiency if each player's payoff lies between the minimum and maximum of the payoffs assigned to him by the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions. In the 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash solution is the unique scale-invariant solution satisfying this property. Additionally, a similar result, relating the weighted egalitarian and utilitarian solutions to a weighted Nash solution, is obtained. These results are related to a theorem of Shapley, which I generalize. For n>=3, there does not exist any n-person scale-invariant bargaining solution that balances fairness and efficiency.

Keywords: Bargaining; fairness; efficiency; Nash solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201110.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201110

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics 199 Aba Khoushy Ave., Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel, 3498838. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anna Rubinchik ().

 
Page updated 2021-04-18
Handle: RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201110