Optimal Commodity Taxation With Moral Hazard and Unobservable Outcomes

Gerard Russo ()
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Gerard Russo: Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa

No 199323, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: The optimal public insurance-taxation scheme is derived for a model with unobservable outcomes. If the government can only observe aggregate commodity expenditures, reimbursement insurance is constrained-efficient. However, two distortions accompany. First, consumers are induced to take (forego) actions which increase (decrease) the likelihood of adverse outcomes (moral hazard). Second, reimbursement insurance creates a subsidy distortion. Moral hazard calls for taxation (subsidization) of commodities which increase (decrease) the probability of adverse outcomes. The second calls for taxation (subsidization) of commodities which are complements to (substitutes for) the insured commodity. An example centered on cigarettes and medical insurance is presented.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1993
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