Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation

Amihai Glazer and Refael Hassin

No 199702, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider an individual's choice whether to be evaluated. Separating signaling equilibria can arise when individuals are risk averse, even if the cost of evaluation is zero for all.

Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1997
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