Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Common Complementarities

Katerina Sherstyuk

No 200212, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: Competitive equilibria are shown to exist in two-object exchange economies with indivisibilities and additive complementarities in agent valuations between objects, provided that complementarities are common across agents. We further investigate whether the competitive equilibrium can be obtained as an outcome of a simultaneous English-type auction mechanism under non-strategic (honest) bidding.

Keywords: competitive equilibrium; complementarities; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D44 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2002
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