A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries

Yoav Wachsman

No 200216, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: Coastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishing firms that operate in their Exclusive Economic Zone. We develop a game-theoretical model in which a fishery owner maximizes the revenue that it collects from firms that operate in its EEZ by charging them a fishing fee. We find that if the number of firms is exogenous and finite the owner is likely to select a fee that is higher than socially optimal. On the other hand, if the owner can choose the number of firms it does not place any restrictions on entry to the EEZ and selects a fee that maximizes net return.

Keywords: Renewable Resources; Fisheries Management; Coastal Nations; Fishing Fee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2002
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