Self-Serving Mayors and Local Government Consolidations in Japan
No 201014, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics
This paper investigates local government consolidations with a focus on public choice aspects in the decision-making. Politicians could lose future payoffs if their locality merges with a larger counterpart, and they may sabotage the merger process. The analysis with data from 3,212 Japanese municipalities reveals that a long-serving mayor would present an obstacle to consolidation.
Keywords: local government; mayor; incentives; merger; public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-his, nep-lab and nep-mac
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http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_10-14.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hai:wpaper:201014
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