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Self-Serving Mayors and Local Government Consolidations in Japan

Akihiko Kawaura

No 201014, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates local government consolidations with a focus on public choice aspects in the decision-making. Politicians could lose future payoffs if their locality merges with a larger counterpart, and they may sabotage the merger process. The analysis with data from 3,212 Japanese municipalities reveals that a long-serving mayor would present an obstacle to consolidation.

Keywords: local government; mayor; incentives; merger; public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2010-08-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-his, nep-lab and nep-mac
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