Cultural values and behavior in dictator, ultimatum, trust games: an experimental study

Sun-Ki Chai (), Dolgorsuren Dorj and Katerina Sherstyuk
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Sun-Ki Chai: Department of Sociology, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa

No 201106, Working Papers from University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics

Abstract: We explain laboratory behavior in the dictator, ultimatum and trust games based on two cultural dimensions adopted from social and cultural anthropology: grid and group, which translate into reciprocity and altruism, respectively, in such games. Altruism and reciprocity characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We find that altruism and reciprocity attributes systematically affect behavior. Subjects with higher altruism scores offer more, accept lower offers and return more. Subjects with higher reciprocity scores are more willing to punish violators of norms by rejecting offers more often, dividing fewer dollars and returning fewer dollars in the ultimatum and trust games.

Keywords: laboratory experiment; two-person game; survey; culture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C91 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2011-05-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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