Climate Regulation and Civil Society Activism
Michela Limardi (),
Jordan Loper and
Alexandre Volle ()
Additional contact information
Michela Limardi: Université de Lille
Alexandre Volle: TREE - Transitions Energétiques et Environnementales - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
CERDI Working papers from HAL
Abstract:
This paper examines how public climate regulation shapes NGO activism against firms. Our empirical strategy leverages the irregular and low-anticipability timing of executive climate regulations, administrative actions issued outside legislative procedures, as a source of plausibly exogenous month-level variation in regulatory exposure. Using a global monthly panel of firm-targeted NGO campaigns across 78 countries (2010-2023), we find that the enactment of executive regulations leads to significant increases in climate-related activism. Event-study estimates show no pre-trends and reveal a persistent post-adoption rise in campaigning. Consistent with our conceptual framework, the effect is larger in countries with weaker enforcement capacity and among nationally oriented NGOs that are better positioned to act on domestic institutions. Together, these findings show that public regulation mobilizes civil society as an informal enforcement layer, extending climate governance beyond formal state action.
Keywords: Environmental Governance; NGO activism; Civil Society; Climate Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-reg and nep-soc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05047276v5
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Related works:
Working Paper: Climate Regulation and Civil Society Activism (2025) 
Working Paper: Climate Regulation and Civil Society Activism (2025) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cdiwps:hal-05047276
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