The incentive consequences of unemployment insurance

L'indemnisation du chômage: au-delà d'une conception « désincitative »

Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, Bruno Decreuse, Francois Fontaine and Solenne Tanguy ()
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Solenne Tanguy: EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Unemployment compensation schemes have two goals: insuring against the risk of unemployment on the one hand, and financing job search on the other hand. During the past decades, the literature has mainly focused on the first goal, highlighting the moral hazard effects originated by unemployment benefits. However, several contributions, both empirical and theoretical, suggest unemployment compensation may also improve labour market efficiency, by alleviating the financial constraints that affect the job-seekers, helping to select the efficient search channel, or favoring the creation of high quality jobs. The present paper offers a synthesis of this literature in the paradigm of sequential job search theory.

Keywords: Unemployment benefits; Credits constraints; Search channels; Wage distribution; Job quality; Allocation chômage; Contraintes financières; Méthodes de recherche; Distribution des salaires; Qualité des emplois (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2006, 116 (3), pp.297-326. ⟨10.3917/redp.163.0297⟩

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Working Paper: The incentive consequences of unemployment insurance (2006)
Working Paper: The incentive consequences of unemployment insurance (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00279392

DOI: 10.3917/redp.163.0297

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