Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents

Lionel Fontagné and Daniel Mirza

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: When do exports lead to rents? And when are they shared with employees? This paper proposes a double empirical test that deals with this question, based on a mix of rent sharing theories and Cournot Oligopoly. We find that most of the OECD exporting activities are associated with some rents that are shared with employees. However, we also show that the destination of sales matter, as rents seem to originate mostly from exporting to other OECD economies or, to a lesser extent, selling to own markets. Exports to developing countries' however, seem to be associated with positive rents only in a small minority of industries.

Keywords: wages; rents; international trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Published in Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, 2009, 75 (1), pp.35-61

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Related works:
Journal Article: Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents (2009)
Working Paper: Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents (2009)
Working Paper: Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents (2009)
Working Paper: Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00307922

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