On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Abderrahmane Ziad

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In this methodological paper, we prove that the famous tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988) in which the capital is completely owned by foreigners possesses a Nash equilibrium even when the assumption of symmetric jurisdictions is dropped. The normality of both private and public goods is all that is needed concerning restrictions on preferences when a peculiar regime of taxation is ruled out. Moreover, we show that conditions about technology allowing for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are satisfied by most of the widely-used production functions.

Date: 2011-03-07
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Published in Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2011, 41, pp.439-445

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game (2011)
Working Paper: On the existence of Nash equilibria in an asymmetric tax competition game (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00618727

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