Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information

Bernard de Meyer ()
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Bernard de Meyer: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: When two asymmetrically informed risk-neutral agents repeatedly exchange a risky asset for numéraire, they are essentially playing an n-times repeated zero-sum game of incomplete information. In this setting, the price Lq at period q can be defined as the expected liquidation value of the risky asset given players' past moves. This paper indicates that the asymptotics of this price process at equilibrium, as n goes to ∞, is completely independent of the "natural" trading mechanism used at each round: it converges, as n increases, to a Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation. This martingale class thus provides natural dynamics that could be used in financial econometrics. It contains in particular Black and Scholes' dynamics. We also prove here a mathematical theorem on the asymptotics of martingales of maximal M-variation, extending Mertens and Zamir's paper on the maximal L1-variation of a bounded martingale.

Keywords: Repeated games; Incomplete information; Price dynamics; Martingales of maximal variation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 69, pp.42-71. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.011⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00625669

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.011

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