Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication

Pierre Fleckinger ()

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies communication mechanisms for two players with symmetric single-peaked preferences. The peaks are privately known and drawn from a uniform distribution before the agents take a collective decision. While for the general setting Moulin (1980) characterized all strategy-proof mechanisms, much remains to be known in the Bayesian framework. The example consists of a dichotomic mechanism, that yields a strictly higher ex-ante expected utility than the best "min-max" rule. The properties of the mechanism are analyzed, then limits and possible directions for generalization are discussed.

Keywords: Informed Principal; Countervailing Incentives; Risk Neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00641865v1
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 55 (1), pp.1-13

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication (2008)
Working Paper: Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication (2008)
Working Paper: Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00641865

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