The timing of elections in federations: A discipline device against Soft Budget Constraint?

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau and Karolina Kaiser
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Karolina Kaiser: LMU - Ludwig Maximilian University [Munich] = Ludwig Maximilians Universität München

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse--with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i.e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare.

Keywords: Soft budget constraints; Fiscal federalism; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
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Published in Public Choice, 2013, 154 (3-4), pp.197-215. ⟨10.1007/s11127-011-9814-y⟩

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Working Paper: The timing of elections in federations: A discipline device against Soft Budget Constraint? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00652261

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9814-y

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