Existence of pure Nash equilibria in discontinuous and non quasiconcave games

Philippe Bich ()
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Philippe Bich: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Axe Economie mathématique et jeux - CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In a recent but well known paper, Reny has proved the existence of Nash equilibria for compact and quasiconcave games, with possibly discontinuous payoff functions. In this paper, we prove that the quasiconcavity assumption in Reny's theorem can be weakened: we introduce a measure allowing to localize the lack of quasiconcavity, which allows to refine the analysis of equilibrium existence

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Discontinuity; Quasiconcavity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2009, 38 (3), pp.395-410. ⟨10.1007/s00182-009-0160-y⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00750953

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0160-y

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