Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract

Jean Beuve () and Stephane Saussier ()
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Jean Beuve: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, GREGOR - Groupe de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School

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Abstract: In this article, we use a large database of more than 3700 interfirm relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner's reputation. Our results also suggest that while formal contracts have a direct negative impact on ex-post cooperation, they are an enhancing factor of cooperative behaviors as soon as the intrinsic hazards of the relationship require higher ex-ante contractual safeguards to secure agreements.

Keywords: relations; interentreprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Industrial and Corporate Change, 2012, 21 (4), pp.811-836. ⟨10.1093/icc/dtr059⟩

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Journal Article: Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract (2012)
Working Paper: Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00820706

DOI: 10.1093/icc/dtr059

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