Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider-Outsider Divide: Evidence from France

Elvire Guillaud and Paul Marx ()
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Paul Marx: SDU - Department of Political Science - SDU - University of Southern Denmark

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Insider-outsider theory argues that in dual labour markets there are two groups with opposing preferences regarding protection against dismissals: i) insiders with permanent work contracts who defend employment protection, because it increases their rents, and ii) outsiders (temporary workers and the unemployed) who see protection barriers to mobility and demand deregulation. Although this argument is influential in the political economy literature, there is little empirical research on outsiders' preferences regarding employment protection. We test the argument using French data on support for a proposed reform of employment protection. Our results show that permanent and temporary workers do not differ significantly in their support for employment protection, while some evidence indicates that the unemployed do show greater support for deregulation. We conclude that insider-outsider theory overemphasises the relevance of employment protection for temporary workers and that care should be taken not to place these workers in a composite outsider group with the unemployed.

Keywords: Employment protection; insider-outsider theory; political preferences; France; single employment contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in West European Politics, 2014, 37 (5), pp.1177-1185. ⟨10.1080/01402382.2014.902169⟩

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Working Paper: Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider-Outsider Divide: Evidence from France (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00965171

DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2014.902169

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