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The Cost of Registering Property: Does Legal Origin Matter?

Mohammad Amin () and Jamal Haidar ()
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Mohammad Amin: World Bank - Enterprise Analysis Unit

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: There is a large literature that finds that common law countries perform better than civil law countries in various aspects of the institutional environment. This article extends these findings to another dimension of institutional quality--the cost of registering property. In a sample of 121 countries, we find that the cost of registering property is lower by 26 percent of the world average in common law compared with civil law countries, a result largely driven by differences in non-notary costs of registering property. We provide plausible explanations for these findings.

Keywords: Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
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Published in Empirical Economics, 2012, 42 (3), pp.1035-1050. ⟨10.1007/s00181-011-0479-7⟩

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Working Paper: The Cost of Registering Property: Does Legal Origin Matter? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00966171

DOI: 10.1007/s00181-011-0479-7

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