Strategic Interaction and Dynamics under endogenous time preference

Carmen Camacho, Çağrı Sağlam and Agah Turan
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Agah Turan: Bilkent University [Ankara]

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Abstract: This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference. Due to the potential lack of concavity and the differentiability of the value functions associated with each agent's problem, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices. In particular, we provide the sufficient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. The supermodular game structure of the model lets us provide the existence and the monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen these results by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response correspondences almost everywhere and show that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. Finally, we numerically analyze to what extent the strategic complementarity inherent in agents' strategies can alter the convergence results that could have emerged under a single agent optimal growth model. In particular, we show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of the poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself.

Keywords: Supermodular games; Strategic growth; Lattice programming; Endogenous time preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, 49 (4), pp.291-301. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.05.002⟩

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Journal Article: Strategic interaction and dynamics under endogenous time preference (2013)
Working Paper: Strategic Interaction and Dynamics under endogenous time preference (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00973380

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.05.002

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