Renégocier pour durer, une analyse empirique des contrats de concessions

Jean Beuve (), Julie De Brux and Stephane Saussier
Additional contact information
Jean Beuve: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School
Julie De Brux: IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of renegotiations on contractual relationship. Using an original data set of expired public-private contracts in the French car park sector, we investigate the link between renegotiations and contract renewals. Indeed, if renegotiations led to surplus decrease, then parties would not be prone to contract again together. Our econometric results reveal that some renegotiation types, their frequency, and their scope clearly impact the probability to see a contract renewed as soon as public authorities have discretionary power on the decision to renew a contract with the same private partner. Hence, our results suggest a positive, negative, or neutral impact on the contractual surplus depending on the kind of renegotiation and the kind of contract that is considered.

Keywords: car park outsourcing; contract renewal; public private contract; renegotiation; contrats de concessions; renouvellement; renégociations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Revue d'économie industrielle , 2013, 141, pp.117-148

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Renégocier pour durer: une analyse empirique des contrats de concessions (2013)
Working Paper: Renégocier pour durer, une analyse empirique des contrats de concessions (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01070808

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().