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Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation

Camille Chaserant () and Sophie Harnay
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Sophie Harnay: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UL - Université de Lorraine - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Keywords: Self-regulation; Collective reputation; Individual reputation; Legal services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01271346
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Published in European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer Verlag, 2015, 39 (2), pp.431-449

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