Deregulation of the Trial Lawyer Profession in Europe

Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ?

Camille Chaserant () and Sophie Harnay ()
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Sophie Harnay: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In keeping up with the larger debate on the liberalization of regulated professions in Europe, this paper is a critical introduction to the economics of the profession of trial lawyer. Current analyses, which are based on the traditional public and industrial economics literature, have proved to be outdated. Moreover, they are not innovative compared to those found in the literature on the deregulation of traditional public goods. Ultimately, they are without any practical applicability. They induce conflicting theoretical proposals that cannot be settled once and for all through empirical studies. Moreover, by only focusing on the debate on whether to regulate or to deregulate, the question as to who regulates is over-looked. Ultimately, the question is: Should the profession be self-regulated or not?

Keywords: Profession; Regulation; Credence goods; Self-regulation; Asymmetrical information; Asymétries d'information; Autorégulation; Bien de confiance; Réglementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2010, 24 (2), pp.147-183. ⟨10.3917/ride.242.0147⟩

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Working Paper: Deregulation of the Trial Lawyer Profession in Europe (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01271365

DOI: 10.3917/ride.242.0147

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