Can we neutralize social preference in experimental games?

Michal Krawczyk and Fabrice Le Lec

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We propose an experimental method whose purpose is to remove social concerns in games. The core idea is to adapt the binary-lottery incentive scheme, so that an individual payoff is a probability to see one's preferred social allocation implemented. For a large class of social preference models, the method induces payoffs in the game that are in line with subjects' (social) preferences. We test the method in several popular experimental games, contrasting behaviors with and without our methodology. Our results suggest that a substantial part of the difference between predictions based on selfishness and observed behaviors seems driven by such preferences , since our method does induce more " selfish " behaviors. But they also indicate that a considerable share is left unexplained, perhaps giving weight to alternative explanations or other types of social concerns.

Keywords: social preferences; experimental game theory; ultimatum game; public goods game; trust game; prisoner's dilemma; dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, 117, pp.340-355. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.021⟩

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Journal Article: Can we neutralize social preference in experimental games? (2015)
Working Paper: Can we neutralize social preference in experimental games? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01297361

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.021

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