Recursive games: Uniform value, Tauberian theorem and the Mertens conjecture " M axmin = lim v n = lim v λ "

Xiaoxi Li and Xavier Venel
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Xiaoxi Li: Department of Computer Science - Zhejiang University - Zhejiang University [Hangzhou, China]

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We study two-player zero-sum recursive games with a countable state space and finite action spaces at each state. When the family of n-stage values {v_n;n >0} is totally bounded for the uniform norm, we prove the existence of the uniform value. Together with a result in Rosenberg and Vieille [12], we obtain a uniform Tauberian theorem for recursive game: (v_n) converges uniformly if and only if (v_λ) converges uniformly. We apply our main result to finite recursive games with signals (where players observe only signals on the state and on past actions). When the maximizer is more informed than the minimizer, we prove the Mertens conjecture Maxmin = lim v_n = lim v_λ. Finally, we deduce the existence of the uniform value in finite recursive games with symmetric information.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Recursive games; Asymptotic value; Uniform value; Tauberian theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://paris1.hal.science/hal-01302553v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2016, 45 (1), pp.155-189. ⟨10.1007/s00182-015-0496-4⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01302553

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0496-4

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