Intellectual property rights, product complexity and the organization of multinational firms

Alireza Naghavi, Julia Spies and Farid Toubal

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies how the intellectual property right (IPR) regime in destination countries influences the decision of firms between procurement from related parties and from independent suppliers while the latter may involve technology sharing or not. Using firm-level data on the mode choice for each transaction and a new product complexity measure, results confirm that firms are generally reluctant to source complex goods from outside firm boundaries. However, when technology is shared, IPRs promote outsourcing of more complex goods whereas without technology sharing, IPRs promote outsourcing of less complex products that are prone to reverse engineering and simpler to imitate.

Keywords: intellectual property right; technology sharing; outsourcing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d'Économique, 2015, 48 (3), pp.881-902. ⟨10.1111/caje.12161⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Intellectual property rights, product complexity and the organization of multinational firms (2015)
Journal Article: Intellectual property rights, product complexity and the organization of multinational firms (2015)
Working Paper: Intellectual property rights, product complexity and the organization of multinational firms (2015)
Working Paper: Intellectual Property Rights, Product Complexity, and the Organization of Multinational Firms (2013)
Working Paper: Intellectual Property Rights, Product Complexity, and the Organization of Multinational Firms (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01306653

DOI: 10.1111/caje.12161

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