Gestion des externalités, droit de propriété et responsabilité civile

François Facchini

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, 1ve show that the property and liability rules can manage the externality problem. For this reason, it is not necessary to use a pigouvian tax or externalities market. This is why, in a first part of this work, we show the contribution and limits of transaction cast theory for the understanding of externality problem. In a second part of this work, we consider that externality management is not an allocation of property right problem but a definition of liabilities.

Keywords: externalités; propriété et responsabilité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01377930
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Published in Économie appliquée : archives de l'Institut de science économique appliquée, 1997, 4, pp.97-125

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Working Paper: Gestion des externalités, droit de propriété et responsabilité civile (1997)
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