A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise

Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding ()
Additional contact information
Hans Keiding: UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex.

Keywords: Delegation; compromise; simplicial complex; contiguity; strong homotopy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01796062v1
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-01796062v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise (2019)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
Working Paper: A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01796062

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().