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On a class of vertices of the core

Michel Grabisch and Peter Sudhölter ()

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: It is known that for supermodular TU-games, the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, and this result remains true for games where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice. Such games are induced by a hierarchy (partial order) on players. We propose a larger class of vertices for games on distributive lattices, called min-max vertices, obtained by minimizing or maximizing in a given order the coordinates of a core element. We give a simple formula which does not need to solve an optimization problem to compute these vertices, valid for connected hierarchies and for the general case under some restrictions. We find under which conditions two different orders induce the same vertex for every game, and show that there exist balanced games whose core has vertices which are not min-max vertices if and only if n > 4.

Keywords: restricted cooperation; game with precedence constraints; core; vertex; TU games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2018-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02043275
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2018, 108, pp.541-557. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.001⟩

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Journal Article: On a class of vertices of the core (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: On a class of vertices of the core (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: On a class of vertices of the core (2016)
Working Paper: On a class of vertices of the core (2016) Downloads
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