Belief-consistent Pareto dominance
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
The classic Pareto criterion claims that all voluntary trades, even on the grounds of heterogeneous beliefs, should be encouraged. I argue that a trade without hope for Pareto improvement remains controversial. I introduce and characterize a notion of belief-consistent Pareto dominance to formalize this argument, which, in addition to unanimity of preferences, requires all rankings in a trade to be supported by some common beliefs that must coincide with the agents' beliefs about the events on which all agents agree.
Keywords: Heterogeneous beliefs; Belief consistent; Pareto condition; Speculation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer International Publishing, 2020, 8 (2), pp.219-229. ⟨10.1007/s40505-019-00178-0⟩
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Journal Article: Belief-consistent Pareto dominance (2020)
Working Paper: Belief-consistent Pareto dominance (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-02973212
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