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Clauses abusives et règles de répartition des frais de justice

Sophie Bienenstock () and Maxime Charreire ()
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Sophie Bienenstock: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Maxime Charreire: EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Unfair terms have been prohibited by French law in consumer contracts since 1978 and in all standard form contracts since 2016. In both cases, the sanction consists in considering the clause unenforceable. This sanction does not deter the drafter from inserting unfair terms in the contract. We are interested in an alternative sanction, according to which the drafter bears all litigation costs. We build on a standard Cournot model of competition in quantities, in which we add unfair terms as well as the parties' expenses in litigation costs. We show that the English rule helps to deter the drafter of the contract from inserting unfair terms.

Keywords: analyse économique du droit des contrats; contrats d’adhésion; clauses abusives; économie des litiges; economic analysis of contracts; standard form contracts; abusive terms; economic analysis of litigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02974290
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Published in Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2020, Économie de la résolution des litiges, 71 (3), pp.503-525. ⟨10.3917/reco.713.0503⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-02974290

DOI: 10.3917/reco.713.0503

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