EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences

Anna Bogomolnaia () and Herve Moulin ()
Additional contact information
Anna Bogomolnaia: University of Glasgow, HSE St Petersburg - Higher School of Economics - St Petersburg, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: To divide a "manna" Ω of private items (commodities, workloads, land, time intervals) between n agents, the worst case measure of fairness is the welfare guaranteed to each agent, irrespective of others' preferences. If the manna is non atomic and utilities are continuous (not necessarily monotone or convex), we can guarantee the minMax utility: that of our agent's best share in her worst partition of the manna; and implement it by Kuhn's generalisation of Divide and Choose. The larger Maxmin utility – of her worst share in her best partition – cannot be guaranteed, even for two agents. If for all agents more manna is better than less (or less is better than more), our Bid & Choose rules implement guarantees between minMax and Maxmin by letting agents bid for the smallest (or largest) size of a share they find acceptable.

Date: 2020-09-20
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03047407
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-03047407

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2021-06-17
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-03047407