Allocation Rules for Networks Inspired by Cooperative Game-Theory

Jean-François Caulier (jean-francois.caulier@univ-paris1.fr), Alexandre Skoda and Emily Tanimura (emily.tanimura@gmail.com)
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Jean-François Caulier: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Date: 2017
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2017, 127 (4), pp.517. ⟨10.3917/redp.274.0517⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-03225796

DOI: 10.3917/redp.274.0517

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